I. Science and the Divine Image
Plantinga: Modern
Western empirical science originated and flourished in the bosom of Christian
theism and originated nowhere else…All of the great names of early Western
science, furthermore – Nicholas Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, Isaac Newton,
Robert Boyle, John Wilkins, Roger Cotes, and many others – all were serious
believers in God…This is no accident: there is deep concord between science and
theistic belief.[1]
Plantinga: How
should we think of science?
(1) Realists
– science is an effort to learn something of the sober truth about our world
(2) Instrumentalists
– the value of science lies in its ability to help us get on in the world
(3) Constructive
empiricists – The point of science is to produce empirically adequate theories;
the question of the truth of these theories is secondary[2]
à
Science is at bottom an attempt to learn important truth about ourselves and
our world…More specifically, science is a disciplined and systematic effort to
discover such truths, an effort with a substantial empirical involvement.[3]
Q1: Is everyone
ok with Plantinga’s characterization of science, developed to this point? If
not, how would you prefer we characterize it?
Plantinga: What
sorts of conditions would be required for the success of science?
Science,
clearly, is an extension of our ordinary ways of learning about the world. As
such, it obviously involves the faculties and processes by which we ordinarily
do achieve knowledge…For science to be successful, therefore, there must be a
match between our cognitive faculties and the world.[5]
Plantinga: How is
Christian belief relevant here?
(1) The
Christian belief that we were created in the image of God implies that we (like
him) are able to know important things about our world and ourselves.[6] (This,
according to Plantinga, is achieved via a sort of pre-established harmony that
God has established between our cognitive faculties and the world, as well as ourselves,
and God himself.)
Contrast this with naturalism.
Chomsky: It is just blind luck if the
human science-forming capacity a particular component of the human biological
endowment, happens to yield a result that conforms more or less to the truth
about the world.[7]
Plantinga: How
shall we understand this fit?
à
One condition of this success is that perception for the most part, and under
ordinary and favorable conditions, produces in us beliefs that are in fact
true.[8]
Q2: What is
Plantinga’s account of truth? What does it mean, according to Plantinga, to
form a true belief?
Correspondence theory
of truth –
States that the truth or falsity of
a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world and whether it
accurately describes (i.e., corresponds [agrees] with) that world.[9]
Q3: Why accept
the correspondence theory of truth? Particularly, given what we know now about
how the corporeal features of different organisms (particularly their bodily
orientation, survival conditions, perceptual machinery, etc.) influences the
phenomenological reality in which they live, does the correspondence theory of
truth even make any sense (e.g., what are the relevant terms that must “agree”
– is it the term and the phenomenon, the term and the “thing in itself”, what
Kant called the noumenon?)?
Q4: Even assuming
it were possible to form beliefs that were true in the correspondence sense, i.e.,
beliefs that agreed with their object, in what ways would these beliefs be
superior (practically, morally, or otherwise) to beliefs that were merely
adaptive?
Q5: Why should
the success of science depend on the capacity of our faculties, perceptual or
otherwise, to produce true beliefs? Does Plantinga mean to suggest that science
on some level entails the
correspondence theory of truth?
Whether our epistemic faculties function (were designed?) to
yield true beliefs or merely adaptive ones is to some extent an empirical
question, and is therefore testable. The argument that they don’t function in this way can be developed
as follows:
(1) On
the correspondence theory of truth, what matters is material agreement between proposition and the world, such that a
belief is a true if and only if it accurately describes the material nature of
its object.
(2) There
are certain situations in which a materially true belief would be less adaptive
than the right kind of materially false one.
(3) Some
of these situations are such that this is reliably the case (or is the case
more often than not), i.e., most of the times that a situation of this type
arises, the materially true belief would be less adaptive than the right kind
of materially false belief.[10]
(4) Some
of these situations are also such that the advantage derived from the materially
false belief doesn’t owe to either (a) some non-standard feature of the situation
(e.g., unfavorable viewing conditions) or (b) malfunctioning faculties (e.g., impairment
or disease).
(5) There
are possible biological mechanisms that reliably function to exploit the
situations described in (2)-(4) that don’t interfere to too great an extent
with the successful functioning of other mechanisms (e.g., those aimed at
producing materially true beliefs in other situations, granted that these exist)
(6) Creating
humans with such mechanisms as described in (5), however, is incompatible with
the nature of God, insofar as (a) “it is impossible for God to lie,”[11]
and (b) such design would constitute a “vicious determination to err,” thus undermining
man’s capacity for free will.[12]
(7) Therefore,
if theism is true, then there are no such biological mechanisms as described in
(5).
(8) But
there are such biological mechanisms such as described in (5).
Q6: What is your
response to the argument above? Do
you think that Plantinga is right to affirm premise (7) above, given that it
entails the denial of premise (8)?
II. Reliability and Regularity
Plantinga: For
science to be successful, the world must display a high degree of regularity
and predictability…[This is because] intentional action requires a high degree
of stability, predictability, and regularity. And of course the predictability
in question has to be predictability by
us. Furthermore, science requires more than regularity: it also requires
our implicitly believing or assuming that the word is regular in
this way.[14]
Whitehead: There
can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in
the existence of an Order of Things. And, in particular, of an Order of
Nature…[This widespread conviction owes to the medieval insistence on the
rationality of God.][15]
Q7: Do you agree
with Whitehead’s analysis above? Does the widespread instinctive conviction in
the existence of an Order of Nature owe to the medieval insistence on the
rationality of God? What other explanations might there be for it?
Plantinga: What
does this “rationality” of God consist in?
à
[T]he medieval put it in terms of the question whether, in God, it is intellect or will that is primary. They thought that if intellect is primary in God, then God’s actions will be
predictable, orderly, and conforming to a plan – a plan we can partially
fathom.[16]
Q8: What are we
to make of the tension between Plantinga’s claim that the belief that God
operates in rational (i.e., predictable, reliable, constant) ways, which is
thought to underwrite the development of science in the West, and James’
recognition that this same belief is what gives rise to the problem of evil,
considered by many to be one of the most serious theological objections? How
can the same belief be invoked to explain both contradictory data?[17]
In light of the debate between Aquinas and William of
Ockham, it would seem that theism doesn’t unambiguously entail either the
perfect regularity of the universe or its opposite. Perhaps, then, Plantinga is
too charitable to credit theism for the success of science. The belief of an
ordered universe seemingly is able to arise and persist without it.
Q9: What fact
about God, with which the general populous was already sufficiently familiar, does
Plantinga take to entail the regularity, predictability, and constancy of
natural processes? If this entailment is as obvious or inevitable as Plantinga
seems to imply, what are we to make of the disagreement between Aquinas and
Ockham?
Q10: On a related
note, which do you think is more likely: (a) that an ordered universe was
inferred or deduced from people’s theistic beliefs; or (b) that these theistic
beliefs were inferred from the observation that the universe seems to exhibit
orderliness? We have clear instances (provided by natural theology) of people
engaging in the latter process; but what would it look like for people to
engage in the former?
III. Law
A. Law and Constancy
Plantinga: This
constancy and predictability, this regularity, was often thought of in terms of
law: God sets, prescribes laws for
his creation, or creates in such a way that when he creates is subject to,
conforms to, laws he institutes.[18]
William Whewell: But
with regard to the material world, we can at least go so far as this – we can
perceive that events are brought about not by insulated interpositions of
Divine power, exerted in each particular case, but by the establishment of
general laws.[19]
Plantinga: It is
worth noting the connection here between moral law and natural law, or laws of
nature…In each case…we have the setting forth or promulgation of divine rule
for a certain domain of application. It is important to see that our notion of the laws of nature, crucial
for contemporary science, has this origin in Christian theism (emphasis
mine).[20]
Q11: Do you find
Plantinga’s claim above plausible (see text in italics)? If not, what other
explanations can you think of that might account for our notion of the laws of
nature?
Plantinga: On
this conception, part of the job of science is to discover the laws of nature;
but then of course science will be successful only if it is possible for us
human beings to do that. Science will be successful only if these laws are not
too complex, or deep, or otherwise beyond us. Again, this thought fits well
with theistic religion and its doctrine of the image of God; God not only sets
laws for the universe, but sets laws we can (at least approximately) grasp.[21]
B. Law and Necessity
Plantinga: There
is still another important way in which theism is hospitable to science: theism
makes it much easier to understand what these laws are like. The main point has
to do with the alleged necessity of
natural law…[L]aws…are [true and universal in form,] but are not accidentally
true.[22]
Plantinga: How
shall we understand this non-accidentality?
à They are nomologically
necessary. This necessity is weaker than logical necessity (the laws of nature
of not logically necessary), but still stronger than mere universal truth (not
all true universal generalizations are necessary in this sense).[23]
Plantinga: Theism
offers important resources here [for explaining what it is for something to be
nomologically necessary]: we can think of the necessity of natural law as both
a consequence and also as a sort of measure of divine power…From a theistic
perspective, the reason [there are natural limits to our technological
advancement] is that God has established and upholds this law for our cosmos,
and no creature (actual or possible) has the power to act contrary to what God
establishes and upholds…The sense in which the laws of nature are necessary,
therefore, is that they are propositions God has established or decreed, and no
creature – no finite power, we might say – has the power to act against these
propositions, that is, to bring it about that they are false…We could say that
they are finitely inviolable. Thought
these laws are finitely inviolable, they are nonetheless contingent, in the
sense that it is not necessary, not part of the divine nature, to institute or
promulgate just these laws.[24]
Many philosophers – most notably, Leibniz – have proposed
that our world, which God has created, is the best of all possible worlds. (In fact, Plantinga himself affirms
this premise in his defense against the problem of evil.) This premise is meant
to defend against certain objections to theism based on apparent non-ideal
features of this world, e.g., the existence of evil.
Now imagine the following scenario:
(1) Assume
there exist two alternative ways of ordering the cosmos, either by establishing
set A of natural laws or set B. Then,
(2) Given
the pragmatic principle that “there is
no difference that doesn’t make a
difference somehow, somewhere, somewhen,”[25] the
cosmos governed by set A would yield a different set of outcomes than the
cosmos governed by set B.
(3) Once
all of these outcomes were taken into account, it seems that one of the two
cosmoses would be qualitatively superior to the other (e.g., contain less evil,
provide for more expressions of virtue, etc.). But then,
(4) If
God were morally perfect, it seems he would be compelled to choose to instantiate
the cosmos that allowed for the superior outcomes. Furthermore,
(5) Insofar
as choosing the best of two possible alternatives is logically entailed by being morally perfect, this choice would not
be contingent but necessary – indeed, logically
necessary. But then,
(6) It
would not be true that the laws of nature are contingent either, since God was necessitated
by his nature to instantiate them.
Q12: Can
Plantinga consistently affirm both premises, i.e., both (a) that God has
created the best of all possible worlds (or that there is such a thing as a
best of all possible worlds); as well as (b) the natural laws that God has
established are contingent? If so, how might we resolve the apparent conflict
between them?
IV. Mathematics
A. Efficacy
Plantinga: Why
should the world be significantly describable by these mathematical structures? Why should these complex and deep
structures be applicable in interesting and useful ways?[26]
Objection: No
matter how the world had been, it would have been describable by mathematics of
some kind or other.[27]
à
Plantinga: Perhaps so; but what is
unreasonable, in Wigner’s terms, is that the sort of mathematics effective in
science is extremely challenging mathematics, though still such that we human
beings can grasp and use it (if only after considerable effort)…That
mathematics of this sort [i.e., exhibiting deep simplicity] should be
applicable to the world is indeed astounding. It is also properly thought of as
unreasonable, in the sense that from a naturalistic perspective it would be
wholly unreasonable to expect this sort of mathematics to be useful in
describing our world.[28]
B. Accessibility
Plantinga: Just
as it is unreasonable, from a naturalistic perspective, to expect mathematics
of this sort to be efficacious, so it is unreasonable, from that perspective,
to expect human beings to be able to grasp and practice the kind of mathematics
employed in contemporary science.[29]
Plantinga again defers to the objection that such abilities
as are exhibited by theoretical physicists and mathematicians are unnecessary
for survival and reproduction, and actually constitute a positive hindrance.
Q13: Do you buy
this argument? Do you agree with Plantinga that the efficacy and accessibility
of mathematics is unreasonable on the assumption of naturalism? If not, what
other (naturalistic) explanation might there be for these features?
C. The Nature of Mathematics
Plantinga: Theism
provides a better explanation for certain properties of numbers and sets,
namely,
(1) Their
abstractness
(2) Their
ontological necessity, i.e., that they exist necessarily
Plantinga: The
most natural way to think about abstract objects, including numbers, is as
divine thoughts.[31]
D. Mathematical Objects as Abstract
Plantinga: The
objects of mathematics…are abstract objects. Abstract objects, so we think,
differ from concrete objects in that they do not occupy space and do not enter
into causal relations…But this creates a puzzle. It seems sensible to think
that the objects we can know about can causally affect us in some way, or at
least stand in causal relationship with us…[I]t seems sensible to think that a
necessary condition of our knowing about an object or kind of object is our
standing in some kind of causal relation to that object or kind of object. If
this is so, however, and if, furthermore, numbers and their kin are abstract
objects, then it looks as though we couldn’t know anything about them.[32]
So, Plantinga claims, since we stand in causal relationship
to God, and God in causal relationship to abstract entities (by thinking them),
we also stand in causal relationship to abstract objects via the mediation of
God.
Q14: Are you
satisfied with Plantinga’s (realist) analysis of abstract objects? If not, what
alternative analysis might be preferable?
For those not familiar with the debate, here is a brief
overview of the most popular alternatives:[33]
The
deepest question about [abstract objects] is whether there are any. Textbooks
feature a triumvirate of answers: realism,
nominalism, and conceptualism. There are many species of each view, but the rough
distinctions come to this. Realists hold that there are [abstract objects],
understood as mind-independent entities. Nominalists deny this (though some
hold that there are tropes). And conceptualists urge that words (like
‘honesty’) which might seem to refer to [abstract objects] really refer to
concepts, understood as mind-dependent entities. Nominalism and conceptualism
often come together and often are assimilated to the extent that they both
involve a non-realist stance about universals. Such a stance is typically
coupled with an attempt to reduce universals to other entities such as sets or
classes of their instances or, as Lewis (1986) has proposed, to sets of all
their possible instances.[34]
V. Induction and Learning from Experience
Plantinga:
Another and less obvious condition for the success of science has to do with
our ways of learning from experience. We human beings take it utterly for
granted that the future will resemble the past…and this expectation is crucial
to our being able to learn from experience [and engage in science]...We human
beings, including those among us with properly functioning cognitive faculties,
are inevitably addicted to inductive reasoning. And this is another example of
fit between our cognitive faculties and the world in which we find ourselves.
Like the others, this fit is to be expected given theism.[35]
VI. Simplicity and Other Theoretical Virtues
Plantinga: Scientific
theories…are underdetermined by the evidence…[For example,] for any finite set
of observation of the path of a comet, infinitely many different curves can be
found to fit…[36]
Plantinga: [W]hy
do we choose certain hypotheses to endorse, when there are infinitely many
compatible with our evidence?
à
Because these hypotheses, as opposed to others, display the so-called theoretical virtues. Among these virtues
the following have been proposed: simplicity, parsimony (which may be a form of
simplicity), elegance or beauty, consilience (fit with other favored or
established hypotheses), and fruitfulness.[37]
Plantinga:
Naturalism gives us no reason at all to expect the world to conform to our
preference for simplicity. From that perspective, surely, the world could just
as well have been such that unlovely, miserably complex theories are more
likely to be true. Theism with its doctrine of the Imago Dei, on the other hand, is relevant in two quite distinct
respects. First, insofar as we have been created in God’s image, it is
reasonable to think our intellectual preferences resemble his…Second, what we
have here is another example of God’s having created us and our world in such a
way that there is that adequatio
intellectus ad rem.[38]
Many of Plantinga’s arguments in this chapter seem to loosely
follow this structure:
(1) The
world has certain improbable features (regularity, predictability, constancy;
laws that are simple, parsimonious, accessible, beautiful perhaps; etc.)
(2) Human
beings have certain improbable features (natural tendency to believe in the
regularity, predictability, and constancy of the world; natural instincts for
mathematical and inductive reasoning; natural preferences for simple,
parsimonious, beautiful theories; etc.)
(3) The
match we find between the world’s features and the features of human beings is
also unusual or improbable.
Q15: But doesn’t
the truth of premise (1) significantly diminish the force of premises (2) and
(3), particular since evolutionary theory predicts that (2) and (3) will follow
from (1)? Do you think Plantinga intends for his argument to be cumulative,
i.e., to acquire additional force from each additional premise, or is he rather
just meaning to drive home the same basic point from several possible angles? If
the former, do you think his attempt is successful? Why or why not?
Q16: Do you share
Plantinga’s doubts that, on naturalism, we should find a fit between our
cognitive faculties and the world we live in? Do any of Plantinga’s specific
examples provide any special difficulty for you? If so, which ones and why? If
not, why not?
VII. Contingency and Science as Empirical
Plantinga: [This
link to the empirical that we call testability] is an essential part of modern
science. Here there is another crucial connection between theistic belief and
modern science. According to theism, God has created the world; but divine
creation is contingent…God is not
obliged, by his nature, or anything else, to create the world; there are plenty
of possible worlds in which he doesn’t create a world outside himself. Instead,
creation is a free action on his part. Furthermore, given that he does create, he isn’t obliged to do so
in any particular way. It is this
doctrine of the contingency of divine creation that both underlies and
underwrites the empirical character of modern Western science. This
relationship between the contingency of creation and the importance of the
empirical, in science, was recognized very early; indeed, the former is the source of the latter (emphasis mine).[39]
Q17: Again, why
think that this is true? Many have argued, for the reasons previously provided,
that libertarian free will and moral perfection are logically incompatible
properties.[40]
Summary
Plantinga: With respect to the laws of
nature, therefore, there are at least three ways in which theism is hospitable
to science and its success, three ways in which there is deep concord between
theistic religion and science. First, science requires regularity,
predictability, and constancy; it requires that our world conform to laws of
nature…Second, not only must our world in fact manifest regularity and law-like
behavior: for science to flourish, scientists and other must believe that it does…Third, theism
enables us to understand the necessity of inevitableness or inviolability of
natural law: this necessity is to be explained in terms of the difference
between divine power and the power of finite creatures.[41]
Of course, by the end of the chapter, Plantinga has offered
far more examples than those mentioned above. Below I have compiled the more
complete list:
What sorts of conditions would be required for the success
of science?
(1)
There must be a match between our cognitive
faculties and the world.[42]
More specifically, humans must have faculties adequate to the task of
discovering and/or apprehending the laws that govern the orderliness of nature
(2)
Conversely, the natural laws must not be too
complex, or deep, or otherwise beyond us
(4)
Humans must also be disposed to believe that the world is regular in
this way
(5)
Math has to be efficacious and accessible (the
world must be describable by mathematics that are accessible by us)[44]
(6)
The future has to sufficiently resemble the past
(to allow for induction)
(8)
Nature has to abide by laws that satisfy the
virtues of theories, or we have to have the tendency to prefer those virtues
that the actual laws actually possess (simplicity, parsimony, beauty, etc.)[46]
How is Christian belief relevant here?
(1)
We are created in the image of God, and like
him, are capable of knowing things about the world[48]
(2)
God providentially governs the world in such a
way as to provide the requisite stability and regularity[49]
(3)
Theism enables us to understand the necessity or
inevitableness or inviolability of natural law: this necessity is to be
explained in terms of the difference between divine power and the power of
finite creatures.[50]
(4)
Theism, by providing the conceptual framework of
laws, helps us understand what it is in virtue of which nature is stable,
regular, and constant
(5)
Theism makes it much easier to understand what
these laws are like, namely as nomologically necessary. Theism offers important
resources here [for explaining what it is for something to be nomologically
necessary]: we can think of the necessity of natural law as both a consequence
and also as a sort of measure of divine power
(7)
Theism provides a natural way to understand what
mathematical objects are (thoughts in the mind of God), and also how they
causally affect us (namely, through the mediation of God, who stands in causal
relation to both numbers as well as us)[52]
(8)
Theism explains why the past resembles the
future, namely because
(9)
Theism explains why human beings have an
instinct for inductive reasoning, namely that God has designed our faculties to
be adequate to this task, because of his interest in our having knowledge of
the world[53]
(10) Theism
explains why nature abides by laws that feature the theoretical virtues, and/or
why we have a preference in our theoretical reasoning for the virtues that the
natural laws actually possess[54]
(11) Theism
provides a natural way to understand what it is for something to be empirical
and contingent, namely in terms of what God did out of his radical freedom.[55]
Plantinga actually makes the stronger claim that the
conditions necessary for science to succeed are unexpected on naturalism, “an
enigma,” “a piece of enormous cosmic luck,” “a not-to-be-expected bit of
serendipity.” Ultimately, in Plantinga’s assessment, “Naturalism stands mute
before such questions.”[56]
Q18: Is Plantinga
right that naturalism has no ready explanation for the fact that the conditions
necessary for the success of science obtain in our world? If not, what
explanations might naturalism offer?
Q19: Any final
thoughts with regard to the points/argument listed above? Do you find any of
them particularly strong or particularly weak? If so, which ones?
The primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that there is deep concord between faith and science, which Plantinga hopes to establish by arguing that certain theistic beliefs are actually required in order for science to arise and flourish.
Q20: Do you think Plantinga's argument that the success of science in the West owes to their theistic (Christian) beliefs was ultimately successful? What other unique features of the West during this time might plausibly have
contributed to the emergence and subsequent flourishing of science?
[1] P. 276.
[2] P. 276-277.
[3] P. 277.
[4] P. 280.
[5] P. 280.
[6] Plantinga says that this feature, while perhaps not
being the chief part of the image of God, is at least a crucial one (see p.
279).
[7] P. 279-280.
[8] P. 281.
[10] In other words, these situations represent
sufficiently stable features of the environment as to allow for the evolution
of mechanisms that exploit them.
[12] Descartes writes in the Meditations, “When we
say...with respect to the body suffering from dropsy, that it has a disordered
nature because it has a dry throat and yet does not need drink, the term
'nature' is here used merely as an extraneous label. However, with respect to
the composite, that is, the mind united with this body, what is involved is not
a mere label, but a true error of nature, namely that it is thirsty at a time
when drink is going to cause it harm. It thus remains to inquire how it is that
the goodness of God does not prevent nature, in this sense, from deceiving us”
(CSM II, 59). He continues later, “[Notwithstanding] the immense
goodness of God, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such
that it is bound to mislead him from time to time...Yet it is much better that
it should mislead him [on the occasion of some sickness] than that it should
always mislead when the body is in good health” (CSM II, 61). He continues
further with suggestions toward how we may even learn to cope with and correct
such errors: “[In] matters regarding the well-being of the body, all of my
senses report the truth much more frequently than not. Also, I can almost
always make use of more than one sense to investigate the same thing; and in
addition, I can use both my memory, which connects present experiences with preceding
ones, and my intellect, which has by now examined all the causes of error” (CSM II, 61). “In the case of our clearest
and most careful judgments, however, this kind of explanation would not be
possible, for if such judgments were false they could not be corrected by any
clearer judgments or by means of any natural faculty. In such cases I simply
assert that it is impossible for us to be deceived. Since God is the supreme
being, he must also be supremely good and true, and it would therefore be a contradiction
that anything should be created by him which positively tends towards
falsehood...Hence this faculty must tend towards the truth, at least when we
use it correctly (that is, by assenting only to what we clearly and distinctly
perceive...)” (CSM II, 102-103).
[13] It should be noted that certain theistic premises can
also allow for such exceptions under special circumstances. For an example of
an argument employing such premises, see Descartes’ Meditations, .
[14] P. 281-282.
[15] P. 282.
[16] P. 283.
[17] James prescribes pluralism as the way out of this
dilemma: in other words, the admission of some element of chance or
irregularity into our metaphysic. See A
Pluralistic Universe, .
[18] p. 284-285.
[19] P. 285.
[20] P. 286.
[21] P. 287.
[22] P. 288.
[23] P. 289.
[24] P. 290-291.
[25] Pragmatism,
.
[27] p. 294.
[28] P. 294.
[29] P. 296.
[30] P. 297-298.
[31] P. 299. For a more in-depth discussion of Plantinga’s
metaphysics, including those concerning abstract objects, see http://rocket.csusb.edu/~mld/The%20Metaphysics%20of%20Alvin%20Plantinga.pdf. See also sect. 5e of “Platonism and Theism” in IEP
at http://www.iep.utm.edu/pla-thei/#SH5e.
[32] P. 301-302.
[33] See section 1.1.5: Realism, Nominalism, and
Conceptualism of “Properties” in SEP at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/.
[35] P. 302-303.
[36] P. 306-307.
[37] P. 307-308.
[38] P. 309.
[39] P. 311-313.
[40] E.g., see Sect. 5: Is Necessary Perfect Goodness
Possible of “Perfect Goodness” in SEP at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfect-goodness/#DivFre.
[41] P. 292-293.
[42] P. 280.
[43] P. 281.
[44] P. 294-296.
[45] P. 302-303.
[46] P. 309.
[47] P. 311-313.
[48] P. 280.
[49] p. 282.
[50] P. 292-293.
[51] P. 294-296.
[52] P. 294-296.
[53] P. 302-303.
[54] P. 309.
[55] P. 311-313.
[56] P. 293.
[57] Recall chapter .
