Welcome to our discussion of Alvin
Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and
Naturalism. This week we will cover the
Preface through Chapter 1: Evolution and Christian Belief. I’m going to post
these in two installments, however, just to space it out a bit.
Just a quick word before we get started. As you’ll soon
discover, everything is presented in a kind of abbreviated, bare-bones format.
That’s not how I wanted to do it, but because of time constraints, that’s
unfortunately how it came out. Should be enough, though, to facilitate
discussion. For the most part, I just provide quotes or short summaries of
passages that I think are significant with a few notes of commentary. I have
focused primarily on the arguments contained in each section, as well as
important definitions, thesis statements, and other articles that feature in
the arguments. Some of the peripheral material is interesting, too, or at least
relates to larger discussions that I think are interesting, so I’ve included a
few of these too. The really important parts to pay attention to are the
questions, which I’ve marked with a Q#:.
Ideally, we’d touch on them all in subsequent discussion, but if you’re
strapped for time, feel free to just pick the ones that most interest you (or
propose your own and address those instead). I also include citations, so if
you need more context, I highly encourage going back to the book. Alright, here
we go…
Preface
Thesis: There is superficial conflict but deep concord
between science and theistic religion, but superficial concord and deep
conflict between science and naturalism.[1]
Naturalism: “I take naturalism to be the thought that there is
no such person as God, or anything like God. Naturalism is stronger than
atheism: you can be an atheist with rising to the full heights (sinking to the
lowest depths?) of naturalism; but you can’t be a naturalist without being an
atheist.”[2]
Q1: Any objections to
the definitions above?
On pp. x – xi, Plantinga offers two possibilities for the
reason that the new atheists (Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher
Hitchens, and Sam Harris) “deal with their opponents not by way of reasoned
argument and discussion, but by way of ridicule and ‘naked contempt.’”[3]
These are:
(1)
Their atheism is adolescent rebellion carried on by other
means.
(2)
They know of no good reasons or arguments for their views, and
hence resort to schoolyard tactics.
James Croft offers a third alternative:[4]
(3)
“What the new atheists are really trying to do is not to
engage with theologians like Plantinga and other people like that…and
demonstrate that their arguments are false at a theological level. What they’re
really trying to do is engage in the culture war, particularly in the United
States, in which a particular form of very conservative Christianity has
extraordinary influence over public policy and people’s lives, and what they’re
saying is that influence has to end, and all around the world, there are
conservative forms of religious belief that are harmful to human flourishing,
and are immoral because of that. And I see their critique primarily as a moral
critique, based on a certain set of human values. And so I actually feel that
their philosophical argumentation is sometimes rather beside the point. What
they’re really engaged in is a process of social critique.”[5]
“[Insofar as their project is
intended to be philosophical at all,] I think that they’re [merely] trying to
show religion is false on the same level that someone like Timothy Keller is
trying to show that Christianity is true. I think they’re aiming themselves
towards at a mass-market readership who are not trained in philosophy. And like
the vast majority of successful apologists in the United States or around the
world, they are not professional theologians. They are people who make
arguments that are broadly understandable to the vast majority of people. In my
experience, most people…do not believe what they believe on the basis of highly
complex theological arguments. They believe them on the basis of the very
flawed forms of arguments that today’s theologians themselves reject. And so I
think that there is a valuable project in popularizing the critiques to the
sorts of arguments that are actually persuasive to most people.”[6]
Q2: Do you think
Croft’s suggestions have merit? Is that what the new atheists are up to, you
think? Regardless of whether or not this is what the new atheists are doing, do
you think that the project Croft describes (of popularizing the critiques of popular
apologetic arguments) is a valuable one? Why or why not?
On pp. xi – xii, Plantinga warns of the trap of becoming too
impressed with the power of science, and consequently treating it as “a sort of
infallible oracle.”
Some treat
science as if it were a sort of infallible oracle, like divine revelation – or
if not infallible (since it seems so regularly to change its mind), at any rate
such that when it comes to fixing belief, science is the court of last appeal.
But this cannot be right. First, science doesn’t address some of the topics
where we most need enlightenment: religion, politics, and morals, for example.
Many look to scientists for guidance on matters outside of science, matters on
which scientists have no special expertise.[7]
There are really two claims here that I’d like to discuss. First, Plantinga suggests that it is an error – more precisely, he calls it an “unfortunate side effect” of scientific successes – that some people form a dogmatic attachment to science. But…
Q3: Granting that
some people do treat science in this way, why should we consider that fact
unfortunate? Is it unfortunate because the attachment is to science
(rather than to some variety of theism, for instance)? Or is it because any
dogmatic attachment whatsoever is unfortunate? If it’s the former, why might
dogmatism with respect to theistic worldviews be preferable to dogmatism with
respect to non-theistic ones? If he means that all dogmatism is unfortunate,
are we to conclude that Plantinga considers religious faith to rest on
something more solid than dogmatism? If so, what provides that foundation?
Of course, what Plantinga ultimately ends up objecting to is
not scientific dogmatism per se, but with treating science as “the court of
last appeal” in the fixing of beliefs. So let’s address this claim.
Q4: If not science,
what (if anything at all) should we treat as the final authority in the fixing
of beliefs? Do you think Plantinga would be comfortable with people treating
science as the final authority in empirical matters at least, since this is
special domain of science?
Q5: Many theists
think that their religious texts (the Bible, the Qur’an, etc.) should be
treated as the court of last appeal in the fixing of beliefs, at least in
relation to moral matters, and often in other domains as well. How far do you
think this confidence should extend? What are the potential dangers of treating
science and religious texts respectively as authorities in the fixing of our
beliefs about various subjects?
The second claim Plantinga makes in the passage above is
that “science doesn’t address some of the topics where we most need
enlightenment: religion, politics, and morals, for example.” But certainly
there have been scientists that have
attempted to address these topics: at least for the past 40 years or so, the
disciplines of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology have been attempting
this (examples include E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology and Human Nature, Andrew Newberg’s Why God Won’t Go Away, Denis Dutton’s The Art Instinct, Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal, and others). So…
Q6: Are the author’s
listed above doing real science when they write on these subjects? If not, what
are they doing? If so, then what does Plantinga mean by science?
Maybe Plantinga wants to make the stronger claim that
science cannot (legitimately) address
these topics, i.e., that such topics do not fall within the magisterium of the
natural sciences. But…
Q7: Why should we
think that is true, especially given the fact that so many scientists appear to
be doing just that? What are some reasons to doubt that science can address the
topics of morality, politics, and morals? What are some reasons to think the
opposite?
(Just to give my 2 cents, I think he’s probably making the
stronger claim, and since this is a peripheral issue, it makes sense that he
wouldn’t include an argument to support it. Nonetheless, in the absence of an
argument, I don’t think he’s given the reader any reason to accept this
stronger claim.)
Q1: I accept the definition, but I am not quite sure I understand the nuance he is getting at. Perhaps he means that Atheism accepts the possibility of a God but that it is either highly unlikely are lacks evidential merit, whereas Naturalism does not even allow for the possibility of a God existing. If this is what he means, I believe this is probably an accurate understanding.
ReplyDeleteQ2: I think the reasons the “New Athiests,” particularly Dawkins, argue the way they do is probably a combination of all three, actually. Not having read much from the others mentioned, aside from what Plantinga quotes, I’ll just focus on Dawkins (I have read one of his books, listened to multiple debates he participated in, and have followed his online writings and postings for some time)—Dawkins is also probably the most prominent person in this category right now.
The reason #1 is applicable to an extent is because I believe Dawkins is significantly motivated by hatred for religion. It’s not simply believing it isn’t true or even believing that religious people are stupid (though he sure believes both), but I believe he truly hates the idea at its core. As such, since religion has such prominence in so many people’s lives and creeps into society to such a large extend, I think he wants to “rebel” against this.
I also believe #2 is relevant because it is in fact true that Dawkins is by no means a theologian. He argues that religion is ridiculous, the Bible (and other holy books) are a hoax, and it is damaging to society overall. However, despite having these beliefs, not having spent any significant time actually studying any religion’s claims and what empirical evidence may in fact be valid, he resorts essentially to “name-calling.” It would be easier to take Dawkins seriously if he actually had any real knowledge of matters pertaining to religion.
Lastly, I believe #3 is probably the primary reason the new atheists and Dawkins in particular engage in the discussion the way they do. I recently read an article (below this paragraph) discussing how Dawkins is considered the “world’s leading intellectual” and later found that the list was actually formed via a poll, essentially. In other words, the public voted him into that “slot.” If that is true, clearly it must mean Dawkins’ efforts are working and this demonstrates the voracity of #3. I think the most significant aspect of this is his attempts to appeal to people in general—namely those who are “unlearned” as it relates to theological matters, or even scientific matters. He doesn’t want to make his case to people who think deeply about these topics, but rather people who already have their minds made up, often with very little information of their own. It’s also worth noting that I think Croft makes what is, to me, a valid claim that the same is true of some theologians, particularly in the area of apologetics.
Opinion piece about the findings:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-david-wolpe/is-richard-dawkins-really-the-worlds-leading-intellectual_b_3226638.html
List of “World Thinkers”:
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/world-thinkers-2013/
Q3: I think the point Plantinga may be getting at here is neither that the attachment is to science rather than some other theism/atheism nor because it is a dogmatic attachment. I believe he is rightly pointing out that science is simply not a reliable means of formulating dogma in many instances. Being dogmatic may not be a negative attribute in and of itself, but only when the source or cause of that dogma is sufficiently reliable.
ReplyDeleteI think this is what he is getting at when he uses the word infallible and mentions that it “regularly [changes] its mind.” The reality as it relates to science is that many areas are often treated as “fact” when either insufficient evidence is available, or simply because scientists make a specific claim. Here’s a few examples of the fallibility of science:
1. This may be cliché, but the concept of the big bang and even the theory of evolution are both examples. Both are called “theory” in part because there is simply not enough information available to us at the moment to empirically demonstrate the factual nature of both concepts. However, both the big bang and evolution are taught as if there is zero doubt that both are true. We are all told “this is the way it happened,” not “this is how we think it probably happened.”
2. Many scientific “facts” change over time, with each later iteration of the fact being presented as equally factual as the prior iteration. For example, as it relates to nutrition, for years, maybe decades, scientists presented the food pyramid as the ideal model for what a healthy person should eat. However, in the last decade, nutritional scientists now know this is in fact NOT the ideal model. Whatever the new model is, it is surely presented as fact the same as the food pyramid once was.
3. Science books contain innumerable references to astronomical phenomena such as space, stars, planets, black holes, etc. Our understanding of these phenomena are based on limited observational methods (i.e., telescopes) and mathematical calculations. However, many of facts we have about these areas also lack empirical evidence since we simply cannot study them in a better way. As such, as technology advances, new “facts” come to light. For example, Pluto has been considered to have met whatever criteria were established to be called a planet, but now new information has come to light leading scientists to declassify it as a planet. Again, the trend here is that it’s former classification has always been “fact,” but now there is a new “fact”—Pluto is not a planet.
These are imperfect examples—no doubt. But my point here, and the point that I think Plantinga is aware of, is that science is not infallible. Each “fact” in time is often treated (or at least presented) as it is pure truth, but is then later proven to be false and a new “fact” arises, which will surely be replaced by something new later on. Science is unable to be that infallible source of truth many wish it were.
Q4: It seems to me that not one area alone (i.e. science, religion, personal experience) is sufficient as the authority in the fixing of beliefs. It would be ideal if all knowledge COULD be based on strictly, personally empirical data, but obviously this would never be the case. We must use a combination of all information available to us and reach the best conclusion possible based on any number of factors. I suspect Plantinga would allow for science to be the final authority on empirical matters, but he would want to recognize the limititations of knowledge one can obtain from science.
Q5: It seems to me that religious texts do contain more value as it relates to moral matters as these texts tell us how we ought to live—something science is rarely able to accomplish. It is also important when discussing a religious text that we establish what level of credibility it has. This requires that a religious text be evaluated from an objective standpoint. I do not believe (and I also do not think Plantinga believes this) that a book should just be obeyed simply because someone claims it has special authority. What evidence do we have that its authority is legitimate? From here we can establish just how far it can go in terms of serving as the “court of last appeal in the fixing of beliefs.”
ReplyDeleteMany people believe that “faith” simply means belief without evidence. But if I say I have faith in my wife, that she will stay committed to me, this isn’t simply belief without evidence. I may not be able to say with 100% certain or based on empirical evidence (i.e., seeing the future) that this is true, but there is a host of factors that contribute to the legitimacy of my faith in her. The same is true as it relates to the Bible. There are many factors that contribute to my belief that the Bible is true and is in fact authoritative in many aspects of life. As such, my confidence in this should extend as far as the evidence allows.
Q6: I am not directly familiar with these authors or their writings, so I can only answer the question broadly. It would seem to me, and perhaps Plantinga, that science is unable to address these areas simply because science generally deals with hard facts, not what a human ought to do in a given situation. For example, science can tell us what happens when one person murders another—the murdered person ceases to live, their body will decompose, their family is now without them, this absence to the family may impact them psychologically, the murder may have served to further some cause on the part of the murderer, etc. These are all facts that can and have been studied and experienced by people, but none of these facts actually tells us why the murder was wrong. And this is a strictly-human problem. If humans did not exist, but animals did, and the scenario were the same, one animal killing another, perhaps for food, perhaps out of a perceived need for self-defense, or perhaps for no reason at all (as some animals do), there is no concept of right or wrong. The same facts exist and are still true, but there is no possibility of or necessity for an understanding that the action was either right or wrong. In my view, in most cases, the hard facts really do nothing to explain why an action is moral or not. It seems to me that these “hard facts” are probably what planting refers to when he talks of “science.”
Q7: Scientists are indeed studying the hard facts about many different areas, but again, these facts do nothing to speak to areas of morality. Let’s take one significant moral and political issue as an example (an easy example, perhaps): abortion. Who doesn’t love a good debate about abortion? ☺
ReplyDeleteWhat does science tell us about the act of abortion? Here’s some off the top of my head, in no particular order:
1. When a fetus is aborted, it ceases to be alive.
2. A fetus may only feel pain after a certain developmental stage.
3. A fetus is really only an embryo at a certain, early developmental stage.
4. The abortion of a fetus may benefit the mother from a financial, social, and physical standpoint.
5. The abortion of a fetus may harm the mother from a social, physical (if there are complications), and psychological standpoint.
6. The abortion of a healthy viable fetus cannot benefit the fetus, by definition, since it is no longer alive.
7. The abortion of an unhealthy fetus, which may have physical or developmental disorders, may benefit the fetus from having an unreasonably difficult or painful life, but this cannot be known with certainty since the fetus is no longer alive.
8. There is no substantive difference between a full term fetus in the womb and out of the womb in terms of its capacity to live.
9. A fetus is, by definition, an unborn human being.
10. A newborn is, by definition, a newly born human being, previously a fetus.
11. A fetus which was conceived via consensual sex is exactly the same as a fetus conceived via rape or incest—it is, by definition, an unborn human being.
12. A fetus grows inside of another, separate human being’s body.
These are some facts that science can tell us about abortion either by studying the actual fetus/newborn, studying the mother’s behaviors and psychological impacts before, during, and after an abortion, etc. However, science cannot tell us whether or not having an abortion is a morally right or wrong. Either side of the political debate can go on and on with their “facts,” but how can these facts tell us that ending the life of a fetus is or is not morally acceptable?
As another example, science can tell us facts about economics and how they work when running a country. However, science is only able to do this from a statistical perspective—what impact specific political/economical policies have had in a certain context (in the past), but it cannot tell us with certainty that the same outcome will occur in a different context. In this example, science has a role to play, but is not the end means to creating a solution.
Q1 – I don’t think titles or definitions really matter, when the intentional ignorance comes from all scientific fields and titles.
ReplyDeleteQ2 –
1. I would say so, if you look at serious apologetics within the scientific community then this is very apparent in their debates. Some fallacies they use are: Ad hominem and Tu Quoque
2. I think a good comparison to this is the church. You typically have the bulk of people who will eat up anything they hear from the pulpit and are blind to facts and logic. Then you those who present the Word and a smaller community of those who actually look into the Word. Often times all parties are in the wrong and sometimes the presenter and other times the critique.
I see the same with the sciences, people do not follow up or research. (check out the subreddit r/atheism for quotes from scientists and atheists)
It is also important to know that science is not an actual fact but rather an assessment of what is seen (see response to Q3 for more indebt)
For the inconsistency of science and their lack of logic and thought I would deffer to the works for Peter Kreeft - http://tinyurl.com/pyszc48
The problem is with the intentional ignorance of the human condition and ones pursuit to escape the moral (or in this case, at the very least, submitting to intelligent design, etc) obligations. That’s why you have outcomes from behaviorist that say rape is okay. (sorry went off topic)
I don’t think titles or definitions really matter, when the intentional ignorance comes from all scientific fields and titles.
Q3 - the root of this is trying to define something spiritual with something physical when it should not be so. One does not look at a painting to define what/who the artist is but can use art to attribute vague characteristic of the artist.
Earth and creation is an overflow of what and who God is. For us to even understand ourselves or creation we have to look out to God.
So the eternal happiness of the triune God spilled over in the work of creation and redemption. – John Piper Desiring God
Nature never taught me that there exists a God of glory and of infinite majesty. I had to learn that in other ways. But nature gave the word glory a meaning for me. I still do not know where else I could have found one. I do not see how the “fear “of God could have ever meant to me anything but the lowest prudential efforts to be safe, if I had never seen certain ominous ravines and unapproachable crags.
C.S. Lewis - The Four Loves
In conclusion science has the right idea but the wrong means. Science uses something corrupt and broken to define something corrupt and broken therefore the outcome is corrupt and broken.
Q4 – the bible is the only infallible source we have. And no person, pope, religious leader, empirical data, science, even thought and logic hold that position.
Q5 –
1. Good questions……To echo what Colby said about faith, the bible gives a good definition of faith. Faith is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen. Hebrews 11:1 We have enough evidence to make a bold claim that God is!
2. The fact that sociology and psychology are the newest sciences seems to hint at something. Also it is worth noting they came to be once religion was taken away from science (when atheism become the norm) And again they try to explain spiritual truths via physical manifestations.
Q6 – See above Q5
Q7 – I think the world wars show that science does not deal with morality very well. Well because the white aryan race is the best race after all…… we need to “purify” and evolve humanity……..
Let me know if I am far off or if this does not make sense or fit - :D
My responses to Colby are marked Q#C, my responses to Олег are marked Q#O.
ReplyDeleteQ1C: The distinction that Plantinga is trying to draw out here between atheists and naturalists is that only naturalism explicitly denies the existence of “anything like God,” i.e., anything that can’t ultimately be reduced to something physical. Atheism denies the existence of God, but that does not necessarily entail the denial of the existence of anything like God. For example, the traditional Cartesian (or dualist) conception of mind as a unique substance, non-identical and non-reducible to physical matter, is by this definition something like God that not all atheists deny the existence of. So atheists and naturalists share in common their denial of the existence of God, but only naturalism includes the further assumption that nothing like God (i.e., nothing that can’t ultimately reduced to something physical, e.g., mind, the soul, etc.) exists either. Make sense?
Q2C: Do you think that the activity of popular (non-theologian) apologetists and popular (non-theologian) critics of religion is valuable even though it might not always present the best or most substantive arguments? Might the effects of these activities (i.e., influencing public opinion and motivating societal change) in themselves make them valuable? Would more honest, fair, or substantive debates be more valuable even if they did not, or could not, achieve these same results? Where does the value of these efforts lie, in their effectiveness at achieving the desired change of opinion or behavior, or in their fairness, honesty and accuracy?
There’s a quote from Clifford’s The Ethics of Belief that maybe applies here. He argues,
Belief is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements for the solace and private pleasure of the believer…Whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away…If [a] belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence [even though the belief be true, as Clifford on the same page explains] the pleasure is a stolen one…It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance of our duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly master our own body and then spread to the rest of the town…It is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
If you agree with Clifford, you might say that the efforts of evangelists and critics of religion only have value insofar as they faithfully represent (or honestly interpret) the available evidence, and that it’s no good to achieve the desired change in belief or behavior if you aren’t simultaneously promoting the habits of mind that enable one to achieve these changes on their own.
You might argue, on the other hand, that the consequences of allowing people to retain certain beliefs, or continue to behave in a certain way, are simply too serious to restrict oneself to methods of persuasion that aren’t ultimately (or optimally) effective. Plato argues in The Republic, for instance, that the rulers of the Ideal city should lie to its citizens in order to coerce them into adopting the lifestyle that is truly best for them. Do you agree with Plato that there is such thing as a “Noble Lie,” or do you agree with Clifford that we have an absolute duty to mankind to guard ourselves from unproved and unquestioned beliefs as from a pestilence?
(continued in next comment)
Q1C: Yes, this makes sense and seems to be basically what I had said as well, but with some further explanation. So, I would agree with the definitions.
DeleteQ2C: For your first paragraph, this is a difficult question to answer. Part of what I was saying was that in the arena of apologists AND “critics of religion,” they both share this commonality to an extent—they appeal to the “masses” for a variety of reasons and often forego a more substantive or even advanced understanding of the concepts at hand in order to accomplish what they may see as a greater good. In most cases, both sides are probably largely effective in their efforts. However, where I see it breaking down and likely being ineffective in the long run is that I believe most followers of these “movements” (so to speak) are already on board with what their respective leader is purporting. I doubt Richard Dawkins, for example, is really bringing on-the-fence athiests into his camp by means of his evangelistic endeavors—the people getting on board with him already shared his beliefs to begin with and are now just being equipped with some vitriolic rhetoric to go with it. Of course to be fair, you could say the same about many Christians and the apologists or evangelical leaders they follow. So, it is my view that either side would be far more effective in the long run to teach people substantive arguments that hold up to scrutiny rather than just appealing to emotion and sensationalism. I would say the “new athiests” are more guilty of sensationalism, however. Ultimately, if people are going to take a hard stance on something, especially if it has as much significance as the existence of God, they should be able to do so with strong, substantive evidence on their side.
I think your quote from Clifford is a good one and is relevant to my point as well. I would agree that it doesn’t do too much good to essentially get people riled up in some dogmatic belief when they don’t even have a rudimentary understanding of that belief. Maybe it benefits them, but it doesn’t benefit society overall.
I would not agree with Plato’s idea of the “Noble Lie” as it seems it could be problematic on so many levels (not to mention that I don’t think it is a Biblically supported idea). I do agree with Clifford, however. We should all strive to have the most thorough understanding of our beliefs as possible and when we don’t we are doing a disservice to ourselves and people in general.
Q3C: So, while I agree that scientists often equivocate between scientific theory and scientific fact, as well as the colloquial and technical senses of the word ‘fact,’ I don’t think that this reveals any flaw with the scientific approach itself. By principle, scientific theory must always strive to accommodate empirical observations, even when those observations conflict with previously well-established theories. Since no present scientific theory can ever take account of every possible future experience, no scientific theory can ever be strictly known to be true. I remember one of my science books in high school made this qualification clear, and it’s stuck with me ever since, so this point has never really bothered me. Although we colloquially use the term ‘fact’ to refer to that which is known for certain and will never change, that is not its proper definition within the empirical sciences. A scientific fact is no more than, as the Princeton online dictionary defines it, “an observation that has been confirmed repeatedly and is accepted as true (although its truth is never final.” To fault science, then, for “changing its mind” whenever new evidence comes to light is just misguided. Science is supposed to change its mind. That’s what lends it its credibility. So while we might justly criticize the tendency of scientists themselves to exaggerate the finality of their favorite scientific theories, this criticism doesn’t carry over to science itself.
ReplyDeleteThat being said, I don’t think this was Plantinga's point. Plantinga talks about people’s tendency to treat science as the last court of appeal in the fixing of beliefs, and seems to suggest that science isn’t quite up to the task. So I asked what the better method was for fixing our beliefs: where should our beliefs come from? What should they be based on? Etc.?...
(continued in next comment)
Q3C: Your point here makes sense. And I think the point I was making was largely the last part of what you said, that “scientists themselves… exaggerate the finality of their favorite scientific theories.” The scientific community needs to be more honest about this. If you talk about something scientific with people just in conversation or you watch some scientific presentation, as I mentioned, it is unlikely that you will see “facts” presented just as the best information we have now—it is far more likely to be presented as “this is the way it is,” which comes across to the average person as “fact.”
DeleteI suppose this may not have been Plantinga’s point, but it seems relevant to his point that science isn’t up to the task. I’ve explained some why I would agree that science may not be up to the task, so what are your thoughts on this now?
Here are my comments on Q4 and Q5, dealing with the question of the comparative reliability of religious texts or authorities and science. I’ll deal with the question of science’s adequacy to address moral matters in my reply to Questions 6 and 7 below.
ReplyDeleteОлег suggested that,
“the bible is the only infallible source we have. And no person, pope, religious leader, empirical data, science, even thought and logic hold that position…We have enough evidence to make a bold claim that God is!”
So let me just ask: What evidence do we have to suggest that the Bible is infallible, or a faithful guide to truth or right behavior? It wouldn’t seem to be its ability to anticipate future scientific discoveries: e.g., the Bible seems to suggest that the earth is young, that languages originated at Babel, that mental illness is caused by demonic possession, etc. It wouldn’t appear to be the timelessness of its moral prescriptions, either: e.g., the God of the Bible prescribes genocide and seems to condone the treatment of women as property. Is it the empirical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus paired with the testimony that Jesus affirmed the authority and divine authorship of certain Old Testament scriptures? But expert Biblical historians have wildly conflicting opinions about these alleged events, so what justifies our confidence in any particular one? And when the subject of our inquiry is the resurrection of a dead man – something that had never been observed before and has never been observed since and flies in the face of everything science tells us about what happens to a dead body – shouldn’t the benefit of the doubt (allowing that there even should remain any doubt) be given to the more conservative interpretation? Shouldn’t we, in other words, follow the principle that Hume prescribes in his essay On Miracles? –
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should have really happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
But even granting the infallibility of the Bible, wouldn’t we still require some further mechanism to ensure the Bible’s infallibility is preserved through the act of interpretation and application to practice? In other words, of what practical use is an infallible text without something else to guarantee that we’ve also understood it properly? God could’ve chosen to reveal himself in a language that none of us understood, and we could still claim that his Word was infallible. But it is the further presumption that we are capable of understanding the Bible that justifies a Christian in treating it as an appropriate foundation for their beliefs about the world and an authority over their actions.
So the question is, how do we get from here to there if not by any of the other means you mentioned, e.g., a pope or other religious leader, empirical evidence, logic and reason, etc.? Once we’ve proposed a mechanism, we should then ask ourselves whether the mechanism we’ve proposed is any less problematic than the one that science offers. If it’s not, then why should we consider it a superior foundation for our beliefs?
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Q4 / Q5: Honestly, I don’t know if I want to steer the discussion in this direction as it is only loosely relevant to the point of the book. As such, I will defer to Oleg if he would like to address some of your larger questions about the authority of the Bible. Patrick, you and I have talked about this many times in the past and we have, no doubt, not reached a satisfying place in your view, but some of these questions are very loaded and I just don’t think they largely fit this particular discussion (and we’re only in the preface!!!). BTW, to be clear, I have LOTS to say about your points, but I just don’t want to get too far off on a rabbit trail. Oleg, do you want to address this since it is based on your response?
DeleteI will say this about your quote from Hume, however, I don’t know that we need to assume the greater “miracle” is the false one right off the bat. Why would we not weigh all evidence available to us rather than just assume the more difficult view is false? You may have only recently learned from one of our recent conversations, Patrick, that I am highly skeptical of evolution. In simplistic terms, we have two possible ideas regarding the origin of the universe: 1) it was designed intentionally by some being, or 2) it was formed from nothing and evolved to it’s current state. Again, a simplistic breakdown of our options (not considering nuances to those). Having myself observed many of the complexities of the world and having a basic scientific understanding of how the universe works, I consider #2 to be far more miraculous than #1. Am I really to believe the universe did not exist and a “big bang” (what does that even mean?) formed it? From there, should it be obvious to me that the unfathomably complex creatures that we are, with aspects such as DNA, senses, the mind, etc., all formed without intention out of very simple non-sentient building-blocks? In my view, the world looks far more like one that was formed intentionally.
By Hume’s logic, I should therefore reject #2 and assume the existence of God. But would you agree that I should gather all available information before outright rejecting one view because it is more “miraculous?” By the way, you know Hume far better than me, so it is possible I am oversimplifying or misunderstanding his point here, so by all means, correct me if I am wrong.
I will mention one last thing regarding your last paragraph in this section. It seems you are assuming that a reliance on scripture is in fact problematic and may even be thinking that a reliance on science is NOT problematic. You seem to suggest the questions you ask do not have answers and that the “proposed mechanism” is therefore more problematic than science—this is not the case. Would agree that both sides have their share of problems? Fortunately for science, it can get away with just saying “I don’t know”—Christians are not afforded the same luxury in some areas (and rightly so).
Colby, on the other hand suggested that,
ReplyDeleteIt would be ideal if all knowledge COULD be based on strictly, personally empirical data, but obviously this would never be the case. We must use a combination of all information available to us and reach the best conclusion possible based on any number of factors.
So why do you think “it would be ideal if all knowledge COULD be based on strictly personal, empirical data”? Why wouldn’t it be ideal if all our knowledge were based on, say, the authority of testimony, i.e., of a religious leader or a religious text? Is the only reason that religions prescribe that its followers “obey” and “live by faith” because not all knowledge can be based on empirical data? If it is, then why do these same religions so often seem to require that its followers believe in religious authorities or texts even in cases when empirical evidence is available and contradicts the testimony of these authorities (e.g., the origin of the cosmos, the reality of miracles, the existence of spiritual beings, the effectiveness of prayer, etc.)? Might it be that religions prescribe obedience and faith in order to replace empirical evidence as the foundation of our belief, even in certain cases in which empirical evidence is possible? Why might religions (or God) hope to loosen the connection between belief and empirical experience, and what might be gained morally or practically from trusting in the authority of testimony instead?
My last question relating to your replies to Q4 and Q5 is this: Whatever evidences or arguments might possibly justify the Christian’s confidence in the infallibility of the Bible, can they possibly amount to as much as all the evidence supporting our confidence in science? Granted, scientists often change their minds about what theory provides the best interpretation of the data they collect, but you can hardly question its successes. Just think of all the things you depend on science for: you probably don’t think twice before boarding an airplane, popping a pill prescribed by your pharmacist, or boarding up your windows when the weatherman says a hurricane is coming. As much as some of us claim to doubt the reliability of science to ground our beliefs and guide our behaviors, none of these behaviors are likely to change any time soon.
So might it be that we’re exaggerating the case against the reliability of science to ground our beliefs and guide our behaviors, and conversely, exaggerating the case in support of the reliability of the Bible for these purposes? I actually think that if our faith in science were half as resilient as our faith in our religion, half as accommodating of minor failures and disappointments along the way, then we wouldn’t even be having this disagreement. If the Bible read like a science textbook, i.e., if it told us all the things that a science textbook told us about the movements of planetary bodies, the development of a human embryo, the behaviors of sub-atomic particles, etc., then we’d revere it even more strongly than we do the Bible – precisely because our experience would more frequently validate the things it told us were true about the world. If we could claim on behalf of our religion all the successes that science has secured for us, and if the only disappointments we had to rationalize away were those in which our nutritionists fed us misinformation about what portions of what food group comprised a balanced diet, just imagine how vindicated we’d feel in our faith. Talk about credibility…
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I think it is obvious why it would be ideal if all knowledge could be based on personally empirical data (that is, first hand observation by YOU, not via someone else). If this were how would could have knowledge, then it would be far easier to have objective facts. I used the word “ideal” for a reason here because that would be the best-case scenario. However, this is rarely the case, so often our next best source of knowledge may in fact be something like the authority of testimony (i.e., writings). At least part of why religious leaders (and scripture) prescribe that we “live by faith” is in fact because there are many things we may never know by empirical data. It is doubtful that I will personally see Christ in bodily form, therefore my beliefs must be based on the next best thing.
DeleteAnd I should mention something very important about what I just mentioned above—more of a question, really—is this really at all different from the knowledge most of us have about anything, especially in science? Has anyone witnessed the “big bang?” Have you personally observed macro-evolution (or even micro-evolution) take place? Have you been in an environment in which gravity does not exist (i.e., space)? Have you seen the double-helix of a DNA strand? If the answer is “no” to those questions (and it IS “no” for each one for all of us in this discussion at least), on what are your beliefs based? Most likely it is through some limited empirical evidence (maybe doing some science experiment in high school or college), and is then mostly based on some outside source. Scientists tell us this is how it works. Science books tell us this. Do we know these scientists? If their work is approved through some board, do we know anything about the reliability of that group? Do we know if anyone else was there to double-check and verify their claims? How do we know our science books, their publishers, editors, and writers are reliable? They may tell us they are (or someone else tells us that that other group is reliable and that guy that wrote it is therefore reliable), but why should we trust them if we have not observed it ourselves? You could say you have seen science in action, but really, how much have you personally observed? What percentage of your knowledge of the universe would you say is based on non-personally empirical data? I would estimate something like less than 99% of it, and I suspect that is the case for all of us. As such, how is this different from a Christian’s belief in God or scripture? You can tell me there is a massive host of reasons that science is considered reliable by means of the reliability of its proponents (i.e., scientists, writers, etc.), and I can say with confidence that the same is true of the scriptures. People have devoted their entire lives to studying different aspects of science, but people have also devoted their entire lives to studying the scriptures in their original languages, studying other historic data from other cultures before, during, and after the Biblical events, doing archaeological digs, etc., verifying the claims of the scripture. How are these two fields different in their reliability?
Regarding another point you make, the existence of contradictory evidence, I would say that the “empirical evidence” that may contradict the examples you gave would be circumstantial and subjective at best. Can you really say that a prayer not being answered according to how you believe it should be answered is “empirical evidence” that prayer is ineffective or that having not observed a “miracle” yourself means miracles don’t exist? This amounts to “if I don’t see it, it doesn’t exist,” which is of course no argument at all.
DeleteRelated to the evidence of the reliability of the Bible compared to the reliability of science, I would say that if one is thoroughly and rightly convinced of the reliability of the Bible, the truthfulness of its claims, and the existence of God, such confidence demands a certain response from the believer. If I am thoroughly convinced that God exists and that the claims of the Bible are true it would behoove me to live my life in a certain way, in light of this truth, would it not? In the examples you gave about science being more reliable and how it affects our lives, those are highly empirical examples. We act in those ways (boarding a plane, taking a pill, boarding up windows) because we have personally observed the science involved to be true. You cannot really compare this to something like evolution or the origin of the cosmos.
I do not think I am exaggerating my case against science in this case. In some instances, we have empirical evidence to the truth of science (see previous examples above), but in many, many instances we do not. Those are the examples I am talking about.
Regarding the Bible’s descriptions of various scientific topics, this is obviously not the purpose for which it was written, so we cannot impose our own purposes on it. It was also obviously written in a specific time and place, so it is more limited in some of those regards—it’s not really fair to compare a science book to the Bible. I would also argue that many people can and do claim an experience accurate to what the Bible purports, even if you personally cannot say the same. I wouldn’t say that one person’s experience differing from yours can be attributed to their greater ability to “rationalize away” their disappointments. I don’t consider my own convictions about the truth of scripture to be so un-substantive and unfounded so as to be so easily discarded or explained away in such simplistic terms. But you and I have had this conversation many times…
The primary advantages that the Bible enjoys over science textbooks, then, in my opinion, is not that it contains more factual content, or that it generates fewer disappointments in our intellectual or practical lives, but rather that it has stronger aesthetic appeal (i.e., it presents a more “intuitive” and emotionally satisfying worldview than that which science is revealing) and lends itself to wider application (i.e., it tells us how we should live in addition to what we should believe). As William James observes,
ReplyDelete"A philosophy may be unimpeachable in other respects, but either of two defects will be fatal to its universal acceptance. First, its ultimate principle must not be one that essentially baffles and disappoints our dearest desires and most cherished powers…[A] second and worse defect in a philosophy than that of contradicting our active propensities is to give them no object whatever to press against…Any philosophy which annihilates the validity of the reference by explaining away its object or translating them into terms of no emotional pertinency, leaves the mind with little to care or act for."
Moreover, most of us were raised within one of these religious traditions, and so we have become thoroughly acclimated to viewing the world in the ways they describe. And, as James again observes,
"The process [of forming new opinions] is always the same. The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first the opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and expediently. This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching just enough to make them admit of the novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible. An outrée explanation, violating all our preconceptions, would never pass for a true account of novelty. We should scratch round industriously till we found something less excentric [sic]. The most violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order standing. Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one’s own biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It married old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity…The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played by the older truths…Their influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is the first principle – in most cases it is the only principle; for by far the most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make for a serious rearrangement of our preconception is to ignore them altogether, or abuse those who bear witness for them."
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You may be right that something like scripture does have a more aesthetic appeal, but I don’t think that this means a religion’s adherents are inherently less informed. This does go back to Q2 as it relates to my points too. People like Richard Dawkins want to argue that Christians (or any other religious person) are simply ignorant or lack the same intuitive intelligence that atheists or perhaps naturalists do. He would, of course, find it acceptable to simply attribute our beliefs to stupidity. But I think some of the same generalizations, where they are true, could be applied to atheists. Most atheists (the “masses” that love Richard Dawkins) are no more informed about their worldview than the average Christian. If you asked them to write out on a piece of paper all the scientific knowledge that they have of the world, they may write a decent amount, most of which would include unqualified statements like, “ the universe was borne into existence when the big bang happened,” or “human beings evolved from earlier forms of life, most recently from primates.” A Christian might write something conversely similar like, “the universe came into existence when God created it,” or “animals were created each in their current state by God.” Then if you ask those same people to expound on these beliefs, asking “how” or “why,” they may be able to give you some more basic description, but probably the depth of their knowledge would stop shortly after the original statements. The average atheist knows nothing more about why or how the universe exists than what they learned in high school. And if they were asked how we know it’s true, their reasoning would amount to “because science books say so,” or “prominent scientists like Richard Dawkins say so.” Atheists often want to believe they are more informed or knowledgeable about their worldview than a religious person is, but if you were to really dig deep into their understanding of the universe, they are no more learned than your average church-going Christian who has never received formal Christian education.
DeleteSo, all that to say, I believe it is fallacious to say that religions have something that is intrinsically more appealing to the “masses” over an atheistic worldview, which is more rational or evidential—this is not the case. Would you disagree with this?
This reply also includes the first paragraph you write in the next comment (before Q6 and Q7).
So, long story short, the aesthetic/emotional appeal and perceived practical utility of a worldview appear to provide stronger predictors of whether large numbers of human beings will adopt them than the worldview’s predictive power and factual accuracy (which again raises questions about how we should seek to influence people’s opinions with respect to these matters – recall Q2).
ReplyDeleteQ6 and Q7 –
So, like I’ve already said, both scientists and philosophers alike have been attempting for some time now to apply the fundamentals of empirical science to the domain of human morality. So it’s just not true that “science doesn’t address some of the topics where we most need enlightenment: religion, politics, and morals, for example,” as Plantinga claims. So Colby’s point, and I think what Plantinga really means to say, is that it seems doubtful that these attempts made by philosophers and scientists can be successful, namely because science is descriptive, while ethics is prescriptive. As Hume put it, you can’t derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. The most famous formulation of this argument (apart from Hume’s, perhaps) was made by G.E. Moore, and goes more or less like this:
"No matter what set of scientifically knowable properties a thing may have (says Moore, in effect), you will find, on careful introspection, that it is an open question to ask whether anything having these properties is good. It is difficult to believe that this recurrent question is a totally confused one, or that it seems open only because of the ambiguity of “good.” Rather, we must be using some sense of “good” which actually is not definable, relevantly, in terms of anything scientifically knowable. That is, the scientific method is not sufficient for ethics."
This was Colby’s objection as well, and I’m glad he brought this up, because this is one of my favorite topics in ethics.
So, not everyone agrees that science is inadequate to answer questions of right and wrong (though, granted, probably most do, and certainly most non-philosophers). Many ethical theories hold, for instance, that all ethical, or prescriptive, terms (right, wrong, good, bad, etc.) reduce to – i.e., have the same meaning as – natural, or descriptive, terms. Such theories are often characterized as naturalist, reductive, or naturalistic reductive. Most naturalistic reductive ethical theories interpret good as some variation of interest-gratifying. For example, for the hedonistic utilitarian, when someone asserts that x is good, all they really mean is x is pleasurable.
So without drawing it out too much, let me just give you one example of how you could defend the claim that science is sufficient for morality. Assume the following premises:
1. Morality is the science of human happiness, i.e., a descriptive theory of what actions or rules of action most effectively result in the satisfaction of mankind’s innate wants, needs, and desires.
2. Mankind’s innate wants, needs, and desires are themselves just empirical facts describable in principle by science.
So applied to Colby’s example about abortion, whether it were morally right or wrong for a particular woman to have an abortion would be an empirical matter determinable in principle by an exhaustive investigation of the actual empirical consequences of either alternative as they relate to the happiness or well-being of all the individuals involved (which are themselves empirical facts about those persons). If the result of this woman having an abortion were a net increase in the happiness or wellbeing of all involved persons, then having the abortion would be the empirically right thing to do. On the other hand, if the result of this woman having an abortion were a net decrease in the happiness or well-being o all involved persons, then having the abortion would be the empirically wrong thing to do. In either case, the rightness or wrongness of the act merely describes the relation of the consequences of that act to the innate needs, wants, and desires of the persons affected.
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So you might object that we don’t have the scientific technology to determine the relationship between any person’s choice and the wellbeing of the persons whom their choice affects. But lacking the technology to determine these things, whether only for the present or forever, wouldn’t change the fact that they are empirical by nature, and therefore fall fairly within the domain of science. We also lack the technology, and probably always will, to predict the future states of particular atoms or molecules, or similarly the future course of biological evolution, even though we might understand very well the natural laws and mechanisms that will determine them. The reason for this is not that the one involves empirical facts and the other doesn’t, or that one falls within the domain of science while the other doesn’t, but rather that the amount of data required to predict these things is virtually infinite, and presumably no scientific instrument will ever be capable of analyzing it all. Nonetheless, science is undoubtedly the best tool we have for making intelligent guesses regarding the future states of atoms and the future course of evolution, if not in detail at least in broad strokes, and arguably the same holds for morality, if in fact it is empirical in nature as naturalistic reductive ethical theories claim.
ReplyDeleteIf you’re still not satisfied about the feasibility of a scientific approach to ethics, I’d be happy to send you some longer papers I wrote on this subject while in grad school. One of them is already posted on this blog: http://muckrunner.blogspot.com/2011/07/volitional-analysis-of-moral.html.
This is in reply to this comment and the one above it for Q6 and Q7.
DeleteTo clarify my point, which is in agreement with Plantinga, sure, science makes an attempt address those areas that need enlightenment, but it falls short. It is insufficient in most cases. I’ll address the example you gave about abortion.
I would argue that there are many flaws to this attempt to answer the question of the morality of an abortion using this example, some of which you already mention too.
1. How do you measure “happiness?” It cannot be objectively measured. This is, of course, the fundamental flaw of Utilitarianism.”
2. Even if it were possible to measure “happiness,” this is in and of itself subjective. To the sociopath or psychopath, there may be an extreme level of happiness associated with killing another person or with even reducing the happiness of another person. Each person may derive a certain level of pleasure from different actions, which can never be measured objectively.
3. It is not possible to determine all possible outcomes and therefore the total level of happiness resulting from one action or another. This would require seeing and knowing the future, or having some advanced technology (as you mention), which will never exist.
4. “Happiness” is probably not the ultimate good to which we are aspiring. Something like human “need” may be a stronger factor here. For example, if the moral issue we are dealing with is abortion, the amount of pleasure certain people may acquire in the long run from having performed the act says nothing about how this may affect humanity in general in the long run. For example, if abortion were legal at all times and under all circumstances, this may result in a large reduction in the human population overtime if it becomes the norm. This may also contribute to an overall disinterest in human preservation, resulting in apathy as it relates to other plights of humanity such as world hunger, war, etc. Those relate to our basic “needs” for survival both individually and collectively. Measuring something like happiness cannot possibly address these types of issues.
I’m not sure I really comprehensively addressed some of the points you made, but I don’t really see how, in the example of abortion, some of these areas of science actually address the issue. Part of answering the question of whether or not science can address moral issues is not looking at the hypothetical of what science MIGHT be able to answer if it had all of the right technology, but what science CAN answer now. Something like the Bible or even philosophy can look at these issues from a subjective standpoint because that is what they claim to do, but if science only has facts, I still cannot see how it addresses these issues. Describing empirical facts does not tell us what to do with those empirical facts.
Can you perhaps provide a different example or put things more in perspective using the example I gave (abortion) and explain how science can answer this from a moral perspective based on what we can do NOW? Actually, if possible, please expound on the abortion example. I think that is a good example because it is a polarizing issue and has major moral implications.
I’ve read some of your longer pieces on this, but, to be honest, they are too technical for my unlearned philosophical mind (and I mean that in all seriousness), so can you try to lay out an argument more simplistically (not technical)?