Scripture seems to provide some justification for this notion, i.e. in books like Romans and Hebrews which outline the rejection of the law in favor of a new covenant of grace. This could be taken as an instance of progressive revelation.
E.g., “Now if the ministry that brought death, which was engraved in letters on stone, came with glory, so that the Israelites could not look steadily at the face of Moses because of its glory, fading though it was, will not the ministry of the Spirit be even more glorious? If the ministry that condemns men is glorious, how much more glorious is the ministry that brings righteousness! For what was glorious has no glory now in comparison with the surpassing glory. And if what was fading away came with glory, how much greater is the glory of that which lasts! Therefore, since we have such a hope, we are very bold. We are not like Moses, who would put a veil over his face to keep the Israelites from gazing at it while the radiance was fading away. But their minds were made dull, for to this day the same veil remains when the old covenant is read. It has not been removed, because only in Christ is it taken away. Even to this day when Moses is read, a veil covers their hearts. But whenever anyone turns to the Lord, the veil is taken away. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And we, who with unveiled faces all reflect the Lord's glory, are being transformed into his likeness with ever-increasing glory, which comes from the Lord, who is the Spirit.” (2 Cor. 3:7-18)
An explanation of such paradigm shifts within God's larger program is provided by the dispensationalists. These are going to say that, as much as the methodology may change, there is an unbroken harmony between them all, and each are in their own way compatible with some more fundamental principle which is essential to God's nature.
A common example is the variant expressions of love. A parent may at times express his love for his children by showing affection, at other times through discipline; at times through intimacy, at other times through imposed distance. All expressions, however, are consistent with the more fundamental principle which motivates them - that is, love.
And the idea is that a well-developed acquaintance with the principle reveals that which is essential to God's nature, and necessarily underlies his every action. We hence become empowered to reject as fixed or essential any particular expression, or 'dispensation', of God's love. This kind of understanding presumably frees one from various forms of legalism, and allows one to take a stand against things which have a foundation in tradition or standard orthodoxy.
E.g., "Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven...
"You have heard that it was said, 'Do not commit adultery.' But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart." (Matt. 5:17-20, 27-28)The revolutionary character of Christ's teaching seemingly finds sanction in an understanding such as that described above - when one understands the principles from which orthodoxy derives, one may dispense with the orthodoxy in favor of the principle.
"Before this faith came, we were held prisoners by the law, locked up until faith should be revealed.So the law was put in charge to lead us to Christ that we might be justified by faith. Now that faith has come, we are no longer under the supervision of the law." (Gal. 3:24-25)
But how far does such liberty extend? Christians have deemed heretical those views which presume to affirm revelations of God's nature and plan for mankind which extend beyond that of Christ. Joseph Smith, for instance, of the Mormon sect made such claims, and orthodox Christians categorically reject them. They do this on several bases, one of which is the following passage of scripture:
"I warn everyone who hears the words of the prophecy of this book: If anyone adds anything to them, God will add to him the plagues described in this book. And if anyone takes words away from this book of prophecy, God will take away from him his share in the tree of life and in the holy city, which are described in this book." (Rev. 22:18-19)
Although this passage only speaks of adding to the content of 'the prophecy of this book', i.e., the book of Revelation as recorded by John, it is commonly applied to that further end as well as a sort of logical implication. Other passages of scripture seem to corroborate this interpretation, such as those in which Jesus warns his followers to be wary of false prophets who will come announcing his return, etc. Fair enough.
But here is the question. How deep can the rabbit hole go within the confines of orthodox Christian doctrine? How much can a Christian's understanding of God's nature transcend or diverge from orthodox Christianity before it becomes heresy? C.S. Lewis in one book uses the term 'Tao' to refer to the broadest, most fundamental basis of all truth, out of which systematized Christianity derives. But he speaks also of a freedom to improvise improvements/ adaptations to the system as one becomes more deeply familiarized with the Tao itself, the source of truth.
Liberalist movements within Christianity largely tell the story of man's attempt to stretch and adapt orthodox Christianity to accommodate certain difficulties which the original forms seem to neglect or misrepresent. Many feel like they absolutely must make allowance for such 'improvements' to preserve the viability of the system in the face of science and a million other factors. Between the options of adapting or abandoning, they concede to adapt.
So, some alter their belief structure to accommodate problematic features of their experience. Others, I believe, follow other influences to similarly foreign places. Internal conviction, even that believed to be of divine origin, might motivate these changes. The development of denominations within the church, the launching of humanitarian or religious movements, etc. can probably be traced back to a nagging impulse which the possessor interpreted as a divine calling or command. They are all alike improvising on the general theme.
Can genuine faith, then, lead one beyond orthodoxy into apparent heresy? What are the safeguards for the 'pilgrims', those that brave the journey beyond the tradition into potentially deeper revelations of God's nature and intentions for mankind? Kierkegaard writes on this theme in his book, Fear and Trembling. Here he considers the story of Abraham, the 'father of faith'. Kierkegaard takes his situation to be paradigmatic of the life of faith - a journey into the unknown, a journey in which one relates directly to God, circumventing even those ethical prescriptions which are typically thought to facilitate the life of faith. He asks, 'is there a teleological suspension of the ethical' such as would justify Abraham in following God's calling even to the alter where he would sacrifice his beloved son? Why divorce one from the ethical norm in order to initiate the life of faith? This question consumes Kierkegaard, and for good reason, I think.
There's so much more to this dilemma that I can't develop right now, but I think the question has been adequately contextualized to fuel initial discussion. Where might faith lead us within the legitimate boundaries of Christianity? How far beyond or outside of orthodoxy, and with what stipulations? When has one definitively transgressed his/her doctrinal commitments? What is the essence of heresy such that one might recognize how to avoid it while remaining faithful to God's call on their lives - even, if necessary, beyond or outside of traditional orthodoxy?
"A common example is the variant expressions of love. A parent may at times express his love for his children by showing affection, at other times through discipline; at times through intimacy, at other times through imposed distance. All expressions, however, are consistent with the more fundamental principle which motivates them - that is, love."
ReplyDeleteYet, parents show this spectrum of love entirely throughout the life of the child. Dispensationalism supposes that humanity works in stages: these people in that age were brutes and needed the rod, but these people, in this age henceforth, are now ready for salvation and mercy. I would suppose that God would be able to change the minds of a time instead of showing different forms of love slowly over centuries, denying the special forgiveness of Christ to thousands of years of souls.
Wouldn't it make more sense to say that as thinking progressed, as ideas gained ground, were argued over, reformulated, and added to, that the morality would become more transcendent over time? That the rod would turn in to the kiss? And then perhaps we realize the kiss is not necessary, does not exist, and we thank it and move on.
Before moving into further discussion, it is important to recognize that there are really three possible categories a progressive revelation can fall into: (1) it may simply extend an orthodox doctrine (2) it may involve an entirely new concept while still not contradicting existing doctrine and (3) it may involve a concept that directly contradicts the orthodox doctrine. Examples of all three types were mentioned in the above post (Jesus' condemnation of lust is an example of a type (1) revelation, Joseph Smith's creation of the Mormon religion is an example of type (2), and Kierkegaard's suggested suspension of ethics is an example of type (3)). As the question was essentially “to what extent can we develop the faith while still adhering to God's plan” and as the three cases are of respectively increasing degrees of development, breaking the issue into these categories will be useful in specifying exactly how far we can go.
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, let us deal with the case with the smallest degree of development. The example addressed above was that where Jesus took the commandment "Do not commit adultery" and extended it even farther to "do not look after a woman lustfully." This sort of extension of accepted doctrine is often practiced in modern churches. For instance, Christians are often told that it is their duty to vote against gay marriage ratification because it is considered an extension of the accepted doctrine that homosexuality is wrong. Now, some may argue that these examples (Jesus' condemning of lust and the churches encouragement of voting against gay-marriage) are not truly revelations, but rather just applications of the existing doctrine. However, a simple examination of the doctrines at hand show that the “revelations” are just that. “Do not lust” does not follow directly from “Do not commit adultery;” one involves simply physical restraint, while the other involves mental restraint as well- one can avoid adultery while still lusting. The same applies for the churches assertion that it is Christian's responsibility to vote against the ratification of gay marriage- one can avoid homosexuality without discouraging others from it. Therefore, we must admit that progressive revelation is possible at least to some extent while remaining safely within the boundaries of orthodoxy.
Now, as for cases where entirely new concepts are introduced to the faith under the premise that a revelation has been received. Perhaps the most readily available and most dramatic example of this would be the aforementioned creation of Mormonism. The Mormon religion involves several tenets never even hinted at in orthodox Christian doctrine, such as the belief that God the Father is married to “the heavenly mother” (http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/Christianity/2008/09/Mormonism-vs.-Traditional-Christianity.aspx?p=6 ). When enter the realm of type (2) revelations, we enter far more controversial territory. Many Christians do in fact consider Mormonism to be a heresy. However, just because this instance of claimed revelation is considered heresy does not mean all such revelations are blasphemous. One such revelation would be that of the common Christian belief about God's relation to time. It is a widely accepted doctrine that God stands outside of time, but we are never told this explicitly in the Bible. Now, it may be argued that this truth is hinted at by the nature of God's explicitly stated characteristics (omnipresence, prophetic ability, etc.), but it is not necessitated by these characteristics, and therefore cannot be claimed to have its roots in orthodoxy. So, it seems it is also possible to have progressive revelation beyond orthodoxy without violating it, but clearly it is harder to be sure of our footing once we step into this realm with a claimed revelation.
ReplyDeleteThe example of type (3) revelation referred to in the previous post was Kierkegaard's suggestion that the ethical code can be suspended in favor of a deeper spirituality. Though Kierkegaard roots his suggestion in a Biblical example (that of Abraham sacrificing Isaac), it is not therefore sound. The ethical code (as far as I understand) is considered to be a representation of God's character. Doing something in contrast to the ethical code is therefore doing something in contrast to God's character, which sets us outside the boundary we have set for ourselves (God's plan could not contain something contrary to His own character). As for Kierkegaard's supporting example, it is shown to be a faulty one upon examination. It is known that one human ending the life of another can be justified (such as in war, self defense, etc.) with the precepts of morality. As for what justifies the near-taking of life in the case of Abraham and Isaac, we need not here discuss it (though perhaps it deserves discussion elsewhere)- we need only assume that since it would result in a contradiction if it was unjustified, there must be a moral allowance for this particular event.
Though we have disproved Kierkegaard's specific suggestion, we have as yet proved nothing about the class in general. As our question when applied to type (3) revelations with the stipulation that revelations not violate God's will becomes “Can revelation lead us to contradict orthodoxy while remaining in God's will?,” the clear direction the discussion must take is whether orthodoxy perfectly reflects God's will or not. If it does, then obviously we cannot contradict it or we would break our criteria. If it does not, then clearly we can contradict it. However, the discussion of this new question deserves its own post, as well as input from others.
****Apparently a friend of mine used my computer and saved his login information- the first post under the name Martin Philip is mine.
ReplyDeleteTwo thoughts, one at a time...
ReplyDelete1. It seems the principle we are converging upon in our defense of type 1 cases is that one may extend orthodoxy to encompass all logical implications of some proposition given in the original canon, granting only that we appropriately ascertain the logical content of that initial proposition. Coriakin points out, however, that there are other type 1 cases (i.e., Jesus expanding the doctrine concerning adultery to include a 'pure heart' stipulation as well) that are "revelatory" and involve legitimate expansions, rather than mere extensions, of canonical doctrine.
But it might be worth mentioning that even within those seemingly straight-forward cases, those in which discovering the fuller domain of one's doctrinal commitments is a simple matter of tracing the logical implications of the initial proposition, we might find the initial proposition to be logically ambiguous. Something of this sort is happening in regard to the doctrine of salvation - whether it is a result of God's sovereign will (as per Calvinist traditions) or man's free choice (as per Wesleyan traditions). Proceeding from either premise seems to terminate in a sort of reductio, until one is forced either to abandon the enterprise, or more or less spontaneously adopt the one position or the other.
It's easy to call these difficult cases 'paradoxes', but it is not obvious that they are so. Paradoxes are typically generated from two contrary premises the truth of which is either logically demonstrable (such as 2+2=4), or strongly intuitive (such as the proposition 'some men are bald'). In this instance, however, we are basically starting from two contrary propositions, acquired by revelation, and in which our initial confidence must be precursory. Courses in systematic theology often struggle to deal with these types of cases and typically adopt what I consider to be an unsatisfying attitude toward the nature of biblical propositions. This attitude will make some appeal to the transcendent nature of divine truth (i.e., that more fundamental reality with which God alone is acquainted), and assert that all propositional formulations pertaining to that reality are bound to be imperfect in some regard: they are 'allegories' perhaps, or 'manners of speaking'; they faithfully express elements of the truth, certainly, but it is not the whole story.
I'm not sure if these individuals would hold that the 'whole' truth is fundamentally ineffable (in which case we have a whole new set of problems), or if God simply withholds it for his own reasons. Anyone have insight here?...
Perhaps this attitude is legitimate in regard to certain propositions - maybe even this particular set of propositions (though I'm dubious). But there must remain a sizable subset of propositions the priority of which in fueling our practical lives is just too high to allow for such ambiguity. These are those the logical implications of which influence our religious commitments (i.e., our rules for action) in important ways. If the logical implications of any two imperatives, for instance, terminate in contradiction, then our practical lives become deadlocked in the tension. I think cases of this sort exist in the Bible, and that it is important to consider how the Christian should handle the task of resolving them into unambiguous rules of action.
2. Second, Coriakin wrote at one point, "As for what justifies the near-taking of life in the case of Abraham and Isaac, we need not here discuss it (though perhaps it deserves discussion elsewhere)- we need only assume that since it would result in a contradiction if it was unjustified, there must be a moral allowance for this particular event."
ReplyDeleteThis point raises an important question as to the priority of scriptural teachings relative to human reason. It seems to me that we have the option of adopting either of two approaches toward scripture: We may, as one option, take a 'presuppositionalist' approach toward scripture, i.e., begin with the assumption of logical consistency amongst all propositions, and then set to work discovering that particular interpretive apparatus that makes the set solid and consistent (while presumably respecting some implicit limit to the elasticity of any one).
Or, as a second option, we could approach them as we would any ordinary proposition and treat the logical content of each as more or less rigid, such that in order to determine its independent validity, or its consistency with some larger set, we need only run it through our standard logical apparatus and let the result of that procedure determine our judgment concerning it.
The argument above seems to rely on the first approach, and could be used to cushion the blow of those bizarre logical implications which result from a more straightforward analysis. Kierkegaard's convictions concerning the nature of faith derived from his methodological commitments, and for this reason seemed to him inescapable. I don't mean to champion either one at this point, but I think it is important to emphasize the importance of our methodology in determining how we hear, process, and understand difficult passages of scripture such as that concerning Abraham's 'trial of faith.' Kierkegaard's 'improvisation' seems to me as sound as any, and yet it led him into strange, and potentially dangerous doctrinal territory, territory which put him at odds with the orthodoxy of his day.
Are we so sure Kierkegaard's analysis wasn't sound? And are we sure that any other methodology can preserve us from making similar inferences, or keep us 'closer to home' in our religious doctrine?
It has been said of many modern Christian theologians that their great aim (namely through this sort of progressive revelation business) is to find ways to express disbelief as belief. Good conversation...
ReplyDeleteJameson,
ReplyDeleteIt seems that way to me as well.
"We may, as one option, take a 'presuppositionalist' approach toward scripture, i.e., begin with the assumption of logical consistency amongst all propositions, and then set to work discovering that particular interpretive apparatus that makes the set solid and consistent (while presumably respecting some implicit limit to the elasticity of any one). "
But of course, this position would only be taken in regards to Scripture, but not so of any other numerous presuppostion-worthy things in life. It's an uneven standard, and is what leads theologians into what Jameson mentioned. Ideas become stretched to the point that they bear no resemblance to the text they were derived from. It seems to me that at that point, the ideas ought to be reconsidered as viable.
Muckrunner,
ReplyDeleteIf I had to answer the original question in one word I would say "no." Isn't it true that orthodoxy becomes redefined as theologians stretch historic doctrines in true faith? Faith allows one to hold on to one's beliefs while still placing them, at least mentally, within the realms of orthodoxy.
“This point raises an important question as to the priority of scriptural teachings relative to human reason. It seems to me that we have the option of adopting either of two approaches toward scripture: We may, as one option, take a 'presuppositionalist' approach toward scripture, i.e., begin with the assumption of logical consistency amongst all propositions, and then set to work discovering that particular interpretive apparatus that makes the set solid and consistent (while presumably respecting some implicit limit to the elasticity of any one).”
ReplyDeleteI do not suggest at all that we should blindly take this approach; however, the premise that the Christian faith is valid was implicit in the question. Where I did go wrong (and I admit that I was in error) was in assuming that this implied the premise that the stories of the Bible were also valid. As to the actual method of proof used, assuming that a given statement is true because otherwise a contradiction would occur is quite common, and is logically sound. In specific, some of the most fundamental theories in mathematics are proved in this manner (http://zimmer.csufresno.edu/~larryc/proofs/proofs.contradict.html )
Good. I, too, think that the presuppositionalist methodology is an appropriate one for certain subjects - riddles, for instance, provide good demonstration of how this attitude toward particular sets of propositions can accomplish analytical tasks that less committal attitudes might discourage us from engaging. I think we have good reasons, though I won't go into them now, for supposing that some of the these more complex analytical tasks might be integral to the Christian life.
ReplyDeleteHowever, and this was my point coming back to the Kierkegaard thing, I'm not sure that either potential interpretation of this passage (i.e., Kierkegaard's or the standard orthodox view) necessarily undermines the validity of the Christian faith - it's just that one logically leads to a more 'doctrinally remote' position than the alternative. It is whether someone like Kierkegaard could be justified in his unorthodox beliefs that concerns me, and this possibility isn't ruled out by the assumption that the passage doesn't contain a contradiction: a 'teleological suspension of the ethical' is logically consistent with the other essential tenets of Christianity, albeit under a more unorthodox interpretation; one need only supplement the given set of premises with the further premise that God's command is logically prior to the ethical (or something like that), and this is the route that Kierkegaard takes.
All this to say I think it's a mistake to discount Kierkegaard's doctrinal eccentricities on the basis that the we must take the validity of the passage (or of Christianity in general) for granted. Thoughts?
Muckrunner,
ReplyDeleteI understand your point about how presuppositionalism can be beneficial insofar as it is mental exercise, but I don't see its validity past that, especially when it comes to an historically grounded text that espouses testable assertions.
I don't know if I'm correctly understanding your last thought, but I suppose there is an issue with Kierkegaard's 'teleological suspension of the ethical' in regards to the validity of the Christian faith. I don't know much about his theological views, but if they clashed with orthodox belief, and especially Scripture, under the assumption that God was directing him to believe contrariwise, wouldn't this either destroy his legitimacy or invalidate the legitimacy of the Church?
Mrstam-
ReplyDeleteI hope to address the first question more fully in a later post - for the time being, suffice it to say that I don't take propositions containing straightforward factual data to accommodate elasticity in their logical content - a date is a date, a named individual is a particular individual, and so forth. The passage in question, however, concerns an event the underlying justificatory principles of which must be inferred from the limited data we were provided. These kinds of passages I think are fair game for entertaining different interpretations (i.e., approaching with the presuppositionalist's methodology).
As to the second question, it's important to understand that Kierkegaard's theology was not explicitly contrary to scripture - rather, it was contrary to the pervading orthodoxy of the time (i.e. the most widely accepted beliefs regarding the fundamental tenets of Christianity). All revolutionary figures within church history championed what were, respective to their time, unorthodox views. So the only significant difference between Kierkegaard and, say, Aquinas, Luther, or Calvin is that the views of these latter figures were eventually assimilated into a new orthodox (in fact, the present orthodox of much of the evangelical tradition), while Kierkegaard's views remain fringe.
The reason I chose Kierkegaard as my paradigm example for this present discussion is that his views are still largely disavowed by orthodox traditions, and also because they have more severe implications, I think, if taken seriously. I'm curious if a naive partiality toward what is orthodox unduly prejudices against such fringe views, even if the proponents of these can demonstrate their derivation from scriptural principles.
I want to get us thinking seriously about unorthodox views and the principles that might motivate them. It might turn out to require a preliminary effort on our part to find that particular fringe figure that we can identify with before we are motivated to a more general openness toward views of this sort. If that's the case, I'd invite each of you to consider someone like this whose religious convictions - though perhaps idiosyncratic relative to the larger population of religious thinkers - YOU find particularly well-attuned. Tell me who he/she is, what they believe, why you find their views so compelling, etc. Treat this as a game - share with us the MOST fringe Christian (?) thinker with whom you can still acknowledge some degree of intellectual synergy. Maybe after we have all identified someone whose views we can feel good championing, we can return to our initial questions with a clarified sense of purpose and personal relevance.